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 Helen Mining petitions this Court to review the United 
States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board‟s 
decision that affirmed an award of disability benefits under 
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, to miner 
John Obush.  Helen Mining asserts that Obush‟s claim is 
time-barred and that the award is not supported by substantial 
evidence.  We will deny the petition for review. 
 
I. 
 John Obush worked in the mines for forty-two years, 
retiring in 1990 at age sixty-two.  Helen Mining employed 
Obush from 1975 to 1990.  He worked last as a shuttle car 
operator.  On July 11, 1989, before retiring, Obush filed a 
claim for black lung benefits.  In support of O‟Bush‟s claim, 
Dr. Phillip Turco opined that Obush had coal worker‟s 
pneumoconiosis from exposure to coal dust during his 
employment in the mines that resulted in permanent 
disability.  On May 23, 1991, however, Administrative Law 
Judge Gerald Tierney denied the claim, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.202(a)(1)-(4), discrediting Dr. Turco‟s medical opinion 
and relying upon two doctors with “qualifications superior to 
Dr. Turco” who attributed Obush‟s pulmonary impairment to 
smoking.  Obush did not contest this decision. 
 
 Obush filed a subsequent claim for black lung benefits 
on January 31, 2006.
1
   Five doctors examined Obush and/or 
                                              
1
 Department of Labor regulations specify that subsequent 
claims may be filed where “there has been a material change 
in conditions.”  20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). 
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his medical records in connection with this claim.  Three 
doctors opined that Obush had a severe respiratory 
impairment causing total disability arising from work-related 
exposure to coal dust.
2
  Of the remaining two doctors, one 
opined that he could neither find nor rule out that Obush‟s 
severe respiratory impairment was due to his exposure to coal 
dust.  The last doctor opined that there was no evidence of 
either clinical pneumoconiosis or legal pneumoconiosis.
3
   
 
 Helen Mining conceded that Obush has a totally 
disabling respiratory impairment and that his condition 
changed since the denial of his prior claim, but asserted his 
claim was time-barred based upon the prior denial of benefits.  
ALJ Thomas Burke issued a decision on May 29, 2008.  He 
determined that the claim was not time-barred, holding that 
the statute of limitations does not apply to claims subsequent 
to the initial claim.  He then concluded that, although the x-
rays did not evince pneumoconiosis, the weight of medical 
                                              
2
 Two of these doctors found that the exam and records 
supported a diagnosis of clinical pneumoconiosis, but made 
separate conclusions that Obush‟s condition met the 
definition of legal pneumoconiosis.  The third doctor 
diagnosed only legal pneumoconiosis.  These exams occurred 
between December, 2005 and March, 2006. 
 
3
 „“Legal pneumoconiosis‟ includes any chronic lung disease 
or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine 
employment.  This definition includes, but is not limited to, 
any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease 
arising out of coal mine employment.”  20 C.F.R. § 718.201. 
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opinion evidence supported a determination of legal 
pneumoconiosis.  ALJ Burke awarded benefits.   
 
 Although the Board affirmed the award of benefits, it 
concluded that the claim was not time-barred for reasons 
different from those of ALJ Burke.  The Board held that the 
statute of limitations applies to all claims (initial and 
subsequent), but concluded that Dr. Turco‟s finding of 
pneumoconiosis, which was the basis of Obush‟s 1989 claim, 
was legally insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations as 
to the present case because ALJ Tierney discredited Dr. 
Turco‟s finding and denied the claim.    
 
 Helen Mining now petitions this Court to review the 
decision of the Benefits Review Board, arguing that the 2006 
claim was time-barrred and, in the alternative, that substantial 
evidence does not support an award of benefits.  We will 
deny the petition. 
II. 
 We first address the statute of limitations, which reads 
as follows:
4
 
Any claim for benefits by a miner 
under this section shall be filed 
                                              
4
 The Benefits Review Board had jurisdiction to review the 
final decision of the ALJ under 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as 
incorporated into the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 
901-945, by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a).  “We have jurisdiction over 
the [Benefit Review Board's] final order pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. § 921(c), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a).”  
Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Our review of questions of law is plenary.  Id. at 313. 
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within three years after whichever 
of the following occurs later—(1) 
a medical determination of total 
disability due to pneumoconiosis . 
. . .   
 
30 U.S.C. § 932(f) (emphasis added).  The implementing 
regulation states the following:  
 
(a) A claim for benefits filed 
under this part by, or on behalf of, 
a miner shall be filed within three 
years after a medical 
determination of total disability 
due to pneumoconiosis which has 
been communicated to the miner 
or a person responsible for the 
care of the miner, or within three 
years after the date of enactment 
of the Black Lung Benefits 
Reform Act of 1977, whichever is 
later.  There is no time limit on 
the filing of a claim by the 
survivor of a miner. 
 
20 C.F.R. § 725.308 (emphasis added).  At issue is whether 
the phrase “a medical determination of medical disability due 
to pneumoconiosis”—a phrase that is not defined in either the 
statute or the regulation—mandates a conclusion that Obush‟s 
claim is time-barred.  
  
 The Board, relying upon the reasoning of three courts 
of appeals, held that “a medical determination of total 
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disability due to pneumoconiosis predating a prior, final 
denial of benefits is deemed a misdiagnosis and thus, cannot 
trigger the statute of limitations for filing a subsequent 
claim.”  J.O. v. Helen Mining, 24 B.L.R. 1-119, 1-122 (Ben. 
Rev. Bd. June 24, 2009); see Arch of Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Director, Officer of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 556 
F.3d 472, 483 (6th
 
Cir. 2009); Consolidated Coal Co. v. 
Williams, 453 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 2006); Wyoming Fuel 
Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 
90 F.3d 1502, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996).  Upon this basis, the 
Board decided that Obush‟s 2006 claim was not time-barred.  
We are persuaded by the analyses of these courts of appeals 
and agree with the Board‟s conclusion that the statute of 
limitations does not bar Obush‟s 2006 claim. 
 
 Though the time-bar issue is one of first impression, 
we have already addressed a related issue with respect to 
black lung benefit claims, and so we begin there.  In Labelle 
Processing Co. v. Swarrow, the employer asserted—based 
upon the denial of the miner‟s initial claim—that res judicata 
barred an award of benefits on the subsequent claim.  72 F.3d 
308 (3d Cir. 1995).  Noting that a subsequent claim must be 
grounded in evidence of a material change in the miner‟s 
condition, we held that “new facts (i.e., events occurring after 
the events giving rise to the earlier claim) may give rise to a 
new claim, which is not precluded by the earlier judgment.”  
Id. at 314.  We then concluded that: 
 
Although it is true that Swarrow is 
now precluded from collaterally 
attacking the prior denial of 
benefits, Swarrow may file a new 
claim, asserting that he is now 
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eligible for benefits because he 
has become totally disabled due to 
coal miner‟s pneumoconiosis and 
that his disability occurred 
subsequent to the prior 
adjudication. 
 
Id.  By the same reasoning, because we are required to respect 
the factual findings and legal conclusions in earlier 
adjudicated claims, we must accept an ALJ‟s conclusion that 
a medical opinion offered in support of that claim is 
discredited.  On this basis, we regard such a medical opinion 
as a misdiagnosis.  See Arch of Kentucky, 556 F.3d at 483. 
 
 Helen Mining argues that construing section 932 in a 
manner that is consistent with Arch of Kentucky is contrary to 
the plain language of the statute and contravenes 
Congressional intent.  Quoting United States v. Kubrick, 
Helen Mining states that “[i]t goes without saying that 
statutes of limitations often make it impossible to enforce 
what were otherwise perfectly valid claims.”  444 U.S. 111, 
125 (1979).  However, as acknowledged in Kubrick, statutes 
of limitations must be given effect in a manner that is 
consistent with legislative intent.  Id.  
  
 “The courts have repeatedly recognized that the 
remedial nature of the statute requires a liberal construction of 
the Black Lung entitlement program to ensure widespread 
benefits to miners and their dependents.”  Keating v. 
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 71 
F.3d 1118, 1122 (3d Cir. 1995).  Consequently, “the Act must 
be applied in a manner which assures compensation to every 
miner who suffers from any of the several lung impairments 
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covered by the Black Lung Benefits Act.”  Pavesi v. Director, 
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 758 F.2d 956, 
965 (3d Cir. 1985).  As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit has stated, the Act must be read “to include the largest 
numbers of miners as benefit recipients.”  Peabody Coal Co. 
v. Hill, 123 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 1997).  
 
 Moreover, with regard to the implementing 
regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 states that “[f]or purposes of 
this definition, „pneumoconiosis‟ is recognized as a latent and 
progressive disease which may first become detectable only 
after the cessation of coal mine dust exposure.”  Helen 
Mining cites a decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia for the proposition that pneumoconiosis 
cannot be properly characterized as latent and progressive.  
See National Mining Association v. Department of Labor, 292 
F.3d 849, 863-64 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  However, Helen Mining 
misreads the decision.  See Midland Coal Co. v. Director, 
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 358 F.3d 486, 
490-91 (7th Cir. 2004).
5
  Moreover, this regulation provides 
                                              
5
 “Midland interprets this language as a positive command 
that a claimant bringing a subsequent application must prove 
that she suffers from the particular kinds of pneumoconiosis 
that have been found in the medical literature to be 
progressive and/or latent.  But that is not what the D.C. 
Circuit said, and more importantly, the regulation itself is not 
so limited.  The rule is instead designed to „prevent[ ] 
operators from claiming that pneumoconiosis is never latent 
and progressive.‟”  Midland Coal Co. v. Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs, 358 F.3d at 491 (quoting 
National Mining Association, 292 F.3d at 863). 
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solid support for reading the statute of limitations in an 
expansive manner to ensure that any miner who has been 
afflicted with the disease, including its progressive form, is 
given every opportunity to prove he is entitled to benefits.  
  
 Finally, a restrictive interpretation of the statute of 
limitations, as suggested by Helen Mining, would be in 
tension with the regulation that enables miners to file 
subsequent claims.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).
6
  The very 
fact that successive claims are permitted—on evidence of 
material changes to the health of a miner—makes an 
interpretation of the statute of limitations that effectively 
precludes such claims untenable.
7
  Therefore, we regard the 
analysis of section 932 provided in Consolidated Coal, Arch 
                                              
6
 20 CFR § 725.309(d).  “A subsequent claim shall be 
processed and adjudicated in accordance with the provisions 
of subparts E and F of this part, except that the claim shall be 
denied unless the claimant demonstrates that one of the 
applicable conditions of entitlement (see §§ 725.202(d) 
(miner), 725.212 (spouse), 725.218 (child), and 725.222 
(parent, brother, or sister)) has changed since the date upon 
which the order denying the prior claim became final.”  
 
7
 Moreover, as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit:  “[W]e note that [the doctor‟s] diagnosis, which 
related solely to [the miner‟s] condition in 1995, could not 
have sustained a subsequent claim that his condition had 
materially worsened since the initial denial of benefits in 
1996.  It would be illogical and inequitable to hold that a 
diagnosis that could not sustain a subsequent claim could 
nevertheless trigger the statute of limitations for such a 
claim.”  Consolidated Coal Co., 453 F.3d at 617-18.  
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of Kentucky, and Wyoming Fuel as consistent with, both, a 
legislative intent to favor miners and the regulatory provision 
that allows subsequent claims.   
 
 Here, the ALJ denied Obush‟s 1989 claim, explicitly 
discrediting the diagnosis of pneumoconiosis by Dr. Turco.  
Because Dr. Turco‟s medical opinion was repudiated, we 
conclude as a matter of law that it is a misdiagnosis and 
cannot be a “medical determination” of pneumoconiosis, as 
set out in section 923.  Therefore, the final denial of Obush‟s 
1989 claim for black lung benefits reset the limitations clock 
as to subsequent claims.
8
  Accordingly, we will hold that the 
Board correctly decided that Dr. Turco‟s medical opinion did 
not trigger the three-year statute of limitations in section 923 
as to Obush‟s subsequent 2006 claim for benefits.  Obush‟s 
instant claim is not time-barred.   
 
III. 
 Helen Mining argues in the alternative that ALJ Burke 
failed to adequately evaluate the evidence in Obush‟s 2006 
claim, thereby errantly concluding that he had legal 
pneumoconiosis.  “We review the decisions of the [Benefits 
Review] Board for errors of law and to assure that it has 
adhered to its own standard of review.”  BethEnergy Mines, 
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 
39 F.3d 458, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1994).  We have plenary review 
                                              
8
 See Arch of Kentucky, 556 F.3d at 483 (“[I]f a positive 
medical diagnosis, though found wanting by the adjudicator, 
was deemed to be sufficient to start the clock, the correctness 
of the adjudicator‟s denial would be called into question, at 
least implicitly.”).   
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of the Board‟s legal determinations.  Id. at 463.  The Benefits 
Review Board is bound by an ALJ's factual findings “if they 
are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent 
with applicable law.”  Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 313.  
In instances where a party challenges a finding of fact by the 
Board or the ALJ, “we must independently review the record 
„and decide whether the ALJ‟s findings are supported by 
substantial evidence.‟”  Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 
788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Walker v. 
Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 645 F.2d 170, 172 
(3d Cir. 1981)); see also Soubik v. Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs, 366 F.3d 226, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“Substantial evidence has been defined as such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”).  As a result, we begin by 
looking at the decision of the ALJ. 
   
 The record contains reports from five physicians 
submitted with respect to Obush‟s 2006 claim:  Dr. Schaaf 
and Dr. Begley, who examined Obush at his request; Dr. Fino 
and Dr. Renn, who examined Obush at the request of Helen 
Mining; and Dr. Martin, whose examination of Obush was 
sponsored by the Department of Labor.  ALJ Burke generally 
found that the x-rays did not establish the existence of 
pneumoconiosis, undermining diagnoses of clinical 
pneumoconiosis made by Dr. Schaaf and Dr. Begley.   
 
 Curiously, however, Helen Mining argues that the lack 
of x-ray evidence of clinical pneumoconiosis also undermines 
the opinions of those physicians who separately concluded 
that Obush‟s condition meets the definition of legal 
pneumoconiosis.  Helen Mining fundamentally misreads both 
13 
 
the record and the words of the ALJ.  ALJ Burke stated the 
following:  
 
The medical opinion evidence 
supports a finding of legal 
pneumoconiosis.  All of the 
doctors of record have concluded 
that the Claimant suffers from 
emphysema, and the weight of the 
evidence shows that the 
emphysema arose from, was 
significantly related to, or 
substantially aggravated by his 
significant coal dust exposure.  
 
The findings of Drs. Schaaf and 
Begley are well documented and 
reasoned and accorded 
determinative weight on the issue 
of the cause of the emphysema.  
Fields v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
10 B.L.R. 1-19 (1987).  Drs. 
Schaaf and Begley, both board 
certified in pulmonary medicine, 
have concluded that the miner‟s 
coal dust was significantly related 
to his development of 
emphysema.  Both relied upon the 
miner‟s long-term occupational 
exposure to coal dust as well as 
the remoteness and moderation of 
the miner‟s prior smoking habit to 
justify their attribution of the 
14 
 
miner‟s disabling obstructive 
impairment to his work as a coal 
miner.  Though both found 
clinical pneumoconiosis, they 
both concluded that their 
diagnosis of COPD arising from 
coal dust exposure did not depend 
upon radiographic evidence of 
coal workers‟ pneumoconiosis.  
Their findings were echoed by Dr. 
Martin. Moreover, Dr. Fino could 
not rule out the Claimant‟s 
significant dust exposure as a 
cause of his respiratory disease. 
 
In contrast to Drs. Begley and 
Schaaf, Dr. Fino's opinion on the 
presence of pneumoconiosis is 
equivocal.  see [sic] e.g., Griffith 
v. Director, OWCP, 49 F.3d 184 
(6th Cir. 1995). 
 
J.O. v. Helen Mining, 2007 BLA No. 5205, 11 (May 29, 
2008) (footnote omitted).
9
  
 
                                              
9
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/BLA/2007/JO_v_HE
LEN_MINING_CO_DIR-
_2007BLA05205_(MAY_29_2008)_095355_CADEC_SD_fi
les/css/JO_v_HELEN_MINING_CO_DIR-
_2007BLA05205_(MAY_29_2008)_095355_CADEC_SD.H
TM 
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We read in this decision a clear statement that the 
award of black lung benefits is based solely on a finding of 
legal pneumoconiosis.  We also regard the statements of Dr. 
Schaaf and Dr. Begley as unequivocally establishing that their 
medical opinions of legal pneumoconsiosis exist independent 
of their finding of clinical pneumoconiosis and their 
interpretation of the x-ray evidence.  Nonetheless, citing to 
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Compton, 211 F.3d 203, 211-12 (4th 
Cir. 2000), Helen Mining insists that the discredited readings 
of the x-ray evidence entirely discredit not only their 
diagnoses of clinical pneumoconiosis, but also their 
conclusions that the record supports legal pneumoconiosis. 
   
 In Island Creek, however, the x-ray was the sole basis 
for the doctor‟s diagnosis of coal worker‟s pneumoconiosis.  
Id.  Here, both physicians not only stated that their opinion of 
legal pneumoconiosis was not based upon x-rays, but they 
also provided data from physical examinations, pulmonary 
function tests, blood gas studies, as well as analyses of 
Obush‟s smoking habit, medical history, and employment 
history that supported the determination of legal 
pneumoconiosis.  Helen Mining‟s argument cannot be 
reconciled with the record. 
 
 Helen Mining makes the same mistake when it asserts 
that the ALJ neglected his obligation to state the reasons for 
his decision, creating instead a “silent presumption” that coal 
mine employment causes pulmonary disease.  To the 
contrary, ALJ Burke explains in detail his rationale for 
crediting the doctors‟ findings of legal pneumoconiosis, 
noting the qualifications of the doctors and the data from the 
16 
 
examinations of Dr. Schaaf, Dr. Begley, and Dr. Martin.
10
  
The ALJ states that Dr. Schaaf, Dr. Begley, and Dr. Martin 
ruled out bronchitis and asthma due to the medically 
insignificant response Obush showed to bronchodilators and 
the lack of any other significant clinical indicia of these 
ailments.  Dr. Schaaf explicitly stated that his conclusion was 
consistent with the standards of the American Thoracic 
Society.  The ALJ summarized Dr. Schaaf‟s assessment of 
Obush‟s smoking history as follows:  
 
Dr. Schaaf noted that as between 
coal dust exposure and smoking, 
it is not possible to ascertain the 
cause of the miner‟s obstructive 
impairment from objective 
testing, but he discounted the 
influence of smoking, concluding 
that the smoking was too remote 
and of insufficient severity to be 
more than a small contributor to 
the miner‟s severe air flow 
obstruction.  Dr. Schaaf 
concluded that the Claimant‟s 
pulmonary deterioration as 
evidenced by his declining FEV-1 
and FEV-1/FVC results during 
1989, 1990 and the present were 
                                              
10
 We note also that Dr. Fino‟s opinion was equivocal on 
whether the record supported a finding of legal 
pneumoconiosis. 
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consistent with a disease resulting 
from coal dust exposure . . . .   
 
J.O. v. Helen Mining, 2007 BLA No. 5205, 8.  The ALJ 
documented that  Dr. Begley and Dr. Martin both regarded 
Obush‟s smoking history as significant.  However, Dr. Martin 
cited a respected medical text in support of his conclusion 
that respiratory deterioration due to smoking ends once 
smoking ends.  Both doctors assessed their clinical findings in 
light of Obush‟s history and concluded that his pulmonary 
impairment arose from work-related coal dust exposure based 
upon their clinical observations.  Dr. Martin‟s opinion was 
also based upon his years of treating patients with this 
condition.   
 
 From all of this, we conclude that the ALJ did not 
create any “silent presumption,” but rather detailed a 
collection of evidence—physical exams, pulmonary function 
and blood gas tests, and analyses of other possible causes that 
included Obush‟s smoking history—to support his conclusion 
that Obush had a chronic lung disease arising out of his 
exposure to coal dust from his coal mine employment.  As 
such, we conclude that the ALJ did consider the relevant 
medical evidence and that the ALJ's finding of legal 
pneumoconiosis was supported by substantial evidence.
11
  See 
20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4).   
                                              
11
 Helen Mining also argues that the ALJ failed to resolve 
conflicts between the opinions of Drs. Schaaf, Begley, and 
Martin, and the opinion of Dr. Renn.  However, as we 
conclude below that the ALJ did not err in his review of Dr. 
Renn‟s opinion, we do not find any merit in this argument. 
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 Helen Mining next complains that ALJ Burke errantly 
discredited the medical opinion of Dr. Renn, proffered by 
Helen Mining, concluding that the record did not support 
evidence of legal pneumoconiosis.  When asked in deposition 
why Obush does not suffer from legal pneumoconiosis, the 
ALJ quoted testimony of Dr. Renn: 
 
“Well, this would have to be a 
direct result of coal mine dust 
exposure having either caused or 
contributed to an existing 
respiratory condition and there is 
no causation or contribution from 
coal mine dust exposure because, 
number one, he doesn‟t have 
radiological evidence of coal 
workers‟ pneumoconiosis.  
Therefore, he could not have the 
focal emphysema.  Without the 
focal emphysema, it could not be 
contributing to the emphysema 
caused by his tobacco smoking 
and, as I‟ve already said, the 
asthma that he has is a disease of 
the general population.”   
 
J.O. v. Helen Mining, 2007 BLA No. 5205, 11-12.  The ALJ 
gave less weight to Dr. Renn‟s opinion because he found that 
Dr. Renn‟s statement was inconsistent with 20 C.F.R. § 
718.202(1)(4) and with the preamble to the regulations.  
Helen Mining argues both that the ALJ misconstrued Dr. 
Renn‟s statement and that the preamble to the regulations 
19 
 
lacks the force of law and cannot provide a legal basis to give 
an opinion less weight. 
   
 After reviewing the entire record relating to Dr. Renn‟s 
opinion, we conclude that the ALJ fairly read Dr. Renn‟s 
words as stating that a finding of radiographic 
pneumoconiosis is a prerequisite to a determination of legal 
pneumoconiosis.  Moreover, the ALJ reasonably concluded 
that this position is at odds with 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) 
(“A determination of the existence of pneumoconiosis may 
also be made if a physician, exercising sound medical 
judgment, notwithstanding a negative X-ray, finds that the 
miner suffers or suffered from pneumoconiosis as defined in 
§ 718.201.”).  Helen Mining never addresses this patent 
conflict.  Moreover, Helen Mining‟s argument regarding the 
legal gravamen of the preamble misses the point.  The ALJ‟s 
reference to the preamble to the regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 
79941 (Dec. 20, 2000), unquestionably supports the 
reasonableness of his decision to assign less weight to Dr. 
Renn‟s opinion.  See Midland Coal Co. v. Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs, 358 F.3d 486, 490 (7th 
Cir. 2004).  For these reasons, we reject Helen Mining‟s 
assertion that the ALJ‟s consideration of Dr. Renn‟s opinion 
was unjust. 
 
 Helen Mining finally asserts that ALJ Burke erred by 
reconsidering facts that were already determined by ALJ 
Tierney in Obush‟s 1989 claim.  Helen Mining characterizes 
ALJ Burke‟s finding that Obush smoked 25 pack years to be 
error because it is at odds with prior factual findings that did 
not change (since all agree that Obush stopped smoking 
before the 1989 claim).  We note, however, that ALJ Tierney 
did not make a “pack year” finding.  Rather, ALJ Tierney 
20 
 
merely gave a range for Obush‟s smoking  as averaging from 
1 to 1 ½ packs per day between 1944 and 1970.  Similarly, 
ALJ Burke estimated that Obush smoked for “approximately 
25 years,” noting that he smoked 1 pack per day 
“occasionally more and occasionally less.”  J.O. v. Helen 
Mining, 2007 BLA No. 5205, 2.  We do not find any 
appreciable conflict in these estimations.    
 
 ALJ Burke did state that Obush quit smoking in 1968, 
while ALJ Tierney stated that he quit in 1970.  It was error 
for ALJ Burke to admit a different date into the record, but 
we regard it—and any potential impact that it may have had 
on ALJ Burke‟s finding of 25 pack years—as harmless.  See 
Freeman United Coal Min. Co. v. Cooper, 965 F.2d 443, 449 
(7th Cir. 1992).  Both decisions estimate that Obush smoked 
approximately 1 pack per day for approximately 25 years and 
both decisions portray Obush as having quit smoking many 
years before he quit working in the coal mines.  Accordingly, 
ALJ Burke‟s error—stating that Obush quit smoking in 1968 
rather than 1970—is not a sufficient basis to vacate the 
decision of the Board.  
 
 Having determined that substantial evidence supports 
the decision of the ALJ, we also conclude that the Board 
adhered to its scope of review, and did not err by affirming 
the ALJ‟s award of black lung benefits to Obush.  
 
IV. 
 For all of these reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
